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This study considers the shipbuilding industry to explain the successive changes in leadership from 
the Schumpeterian perspective. The window of opportunity for Japan to forge ahead of the UK was 
the arrival and employment of new technologies, a method referred to as welding block. The 
Japanese firms also adopted path-creation, a strategy that involves the use of innovations more 
promptly than the incumbent UK, which had delayed adoption due to the opposition of labor unions. 
The leadership shift from Japan to Korea also represents path-creation given that Korean firms 
responded quickly to the rise of a new window of opportunity (i.e., systematized 3D computer aided 
design technologies) and met the newly rising demand in large vessels that was the second window 
of opportunity. Both of these cases of path-creation are an adoption and follow-on innovation mode 
because the latecomers not only adopted new technologies, but also reinvented them further into a new 
system of production. This study also finds the unique, institutional nature of the source of the 
incumbent trap in the shipbuilding industry, which is different from that associated with the relative 
costs and benefits of new versus old technologies. In addition, this study identifies the peculiarity of 
the technological regimes of the shipbuilding sector and the associated unique nature of the 
technological window of opportunity, which are not merely competence-destroying innovations 
(Tushman and Anderson 1986) of component technologies but a consolidation of a new systematized 
technology that has changed the entire process of shipbuilding. 
 












The changes in industrial leadership from an incumbent to a late entrant country are often observed 
in various industries, involving both the advanced and latecomer countries from the South. Mowery 
and Nelson (1999) examined such changes among advanced countries, whereas Lee and Malerba 
(2015a and b) looked into the rise of latecomer countries from the South. In particular, the latter 
studies focused on more than two or successive changes in industry leadership. For example, in the 
mobile phone industry, Motorola was an early leader with its invention of the product itself but was 
dethroned by Nokia with the rise of digital phones. Korean firms have been the market leader of the 
industry since 2012 although it is seriously being challenged by Chinese firms. 
Lee and Malerba (2016a) referred to these phenomena of successive changes in industrial 
leadership as “catch-up cycles,” in which catch-up pertains to the substantial closing of the gap in 
market shares between the firms in a leading country and those in a latecomer or follower country. 
Among the attempts to explain these phenomena, the sectoral studies collected in the special issue of 
Research Policy have handled cases of various sectors, such as mobile phones, the memory chip 
segment of semi-conductors, cameras, steel, mid-sized jets, and wine. These cases were analyzed in 
view of the common theoretical framework on successive changes in industrial leadership and the 
catch-up cycle proposed by Lee and Malerba (2016a); the main results are summarized in the work of 
Lee and Malerba (2016b). 
The current study considers the shipbuilding industry because it has also experienced similar 
changes in industrial leadership over the last 200 years. Leadership is measured through the size of 
production by firms in each country. The American wooden ship dominated the shipbuilding industry 
in the first half of the 19th century but was later governed by the UK in the latter half of the same 
century. After World War II, in the late 1950s, the leadership shifted to Japan but was eventually 








This study follows the framework of Lee and Malerba (2016a) that suggests that successive 
changes in industrial leadership can be explained by considering the newly opened windows of 
opportunity and diverse responses to them by the incumbents and latecomers. In other words, the 
framework explains the successive changes of leadership because of the responses of the firms in the 
incumbent or latecomer country to the diverse windows of opportunity. The concept of the windows 
of opportunity was first used by Perez and Soete (1988) to refer to the role of the rise of new 
techno-economic paradigms in generating leapfrogging by the latecomers who take advantage of a 
new paradigm and thereby surpass the old incumbents. The framework broadens this notion by 
considering additional dimensions that correspond to the building blocks of a sectoral system, such as 
technological, demand, and institutional windows (Lee and Malerba, 2016a). With the notion of 
“windows of opportunity,” the framework uses the concept of “response” by firms and systems, 
particularly path-following, stage-skipping, and path-creation (Lee and Lim 2001). A few firms from 
emerging countries and the sectoral system that supports them may respond to the emergence of 
opportunities and rise to global leadership. Nonetheless, the current leaders from a certain country may 
fall behind be due to their lack of effectiveness in the response, often due to an “incumbent trap” 
(Chandy and Tellis, 2000), by the firms and their sectoral system, leading to misalignments to the new 
window. To utilize this framework, this study can also be considered to follow the method of 
“appreciative theorizing,” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 46) which aims to provide the “causal 
explanations of observed patterns” of leadership changes across sectors. 
We primarily hypothesize that in the shipbuilding industry, the shift of leadership from the UK to 
Japan can be considered path-creation because the Japanese firms created a comprehensive system 
(inter-related sets) of welding-block technology. This system is effective for producing standard 
vessels and results in high productivity. Contrary to the advancement among Japanese firms, the UK 
was trapped in the traditional craft skill-based non-standard vessel shipbuilding system with the labor 
union of skilled labor force favoring the old technology. In the case of leadership change from Japan to 








large vessels and the emergence of the “extended 3D computer aided design (CAD) system” that can 
integrate various operations. Compared with Korean firms, the Japanese firms were stuck into the 
incumbent trap of remaining with the “unextended 3D CAD system” because of their slow response 
in accommodating 3D CAD technology from Western countries and their decision not to invest in 
upgraded facilities (e.g., large docks) to build large vessels. These factors were affected by the rapid 
appreciation of the Japanese currency and the past trauma of the deep depression in the 1970s and 
1980s. This study attempts to contribute to the literature in two means. First, this study extends the 
literature by elaborating the details of the process of leadership changes in the shipbuilding industry 
with focus on the windows of opportunity and the specifically required nature of the technological 
window in this sector. Second, this study widens the literature by indicating that the source of the 
incumbent trap may include not only the economic calculations of the costs and benefits of new 
versus old technologies, but the previous institutional rigidities and legacies as well. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into six sections. Following the Introduction, Section 2 
presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses. Section 3 provides a descriptive account of the 
leadership changes from UK to Japan and then from Japan to Korea. Sections 4 and 5 analyze these 
cases of leadership change, respectively, to explain the process by referring to the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses1 
 
Vernon’s product life cycle theory (1966) is not a theory at the sector level but at the product 
level. Thus, his theory does not serve the main purpose of our study, as it does not consider the 
possibility or phenomenon that latecomer firms control not only the production but also R&D, and 
brands of goods, whereas firms from advanced countries lose in the competition. As such, this study 
relies on the work of Lee and Malerba (2016a) and its application to the steel industry. Lee and 
Malerba proposed an alternative theoretical framework, which considers the diverse factors beyond 
1The theoretical framework is elaborated based heavily on Lee and Ki (2016), but the hypotheses are 

















the level of a single product or technology to include the factors at the levels of industry and even 
those at the levels of national institutions and the interactions among them. The framework 
introduced by these researchers and this study rely on the neo-Schumpeterian concepts of innovation 
systems, including the national systems of innovation (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993) and setoral 
systems of innovation (hereafter SSI) (Malerba 2002, 2004). Malerba (2004) applied the SSI 
framework to industries in advanced countries and defined sector as a set of activities unified by 
linked product groups for a given or emerging demand and share a common knowledge. Matching 
each component of the SSI to diverse windows of opportunity is useful to explain the successive 
changes in industrial leadership. 
Several types of windows can be opened up for late entrants. One is the rise of a new 
techno-economic paradigm (Perez and Soete 1988) that tends to threaten the advantage of the 
existing first movers or incumbents rooted in pre-existing investment in the existing vantage of 
capital. When a new paradigm arrives, both latecomers and incumbents stand on the same starting 
line with the new technology, but the latter may fall behind by clinging to old technology they 
dominate. The propensity for incumbents to stick with the old paradigm is somewhat rational 
considering the replacement effect (Arrow 1962) because the incumbents who considerably invest 
early want to recover the investment costs fully.2 In this study, we do not address the shift of 
techno-economic paradigm; instead, we look into a mini paradigm, a new generation of technologies, 
or a new trajectory. 
Another type of window of opportunity is derived from the second components of SSI (demand 
conditions or market regimes), that is, a business cycle and/or abrupt changes in market demand, 
including the rise of new consumers. Mathews (2005) indicated that business cycles create 
opportunities for challengers to stir up the industry because downturns play a cleansing role. Thus, 
the weak incumbents are forced into bankruptcy, and resources are released at low prices to be 
picked up by the challenger firms that aim to enter the industry. The third window of opportunity can 
be opened up by the government because this opportunity can often generate an asymmetric 
2Innovation replaces the existing profits of incumbents, but a late-entrant firm has few profits to replace. Thus, 
















environment for incumbents and entrants through a range of regulations and direct supportive actions 
for entrants. These asymmetries can be used by latecomers to offset the initial cost differences 
associated with the late entry (Mu and Lee 2005). 
Although these types of windows of opportunity are events that are exogenous to latecomer firms, 
as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, firms should recognize the open windows and take 
advantage of them to realize their potential. In other words, the strategies of firms themselves 
interact with the windows of opportunity as well as the technological and market environments that 
affect their performance. Accordingly, our model is not deterministic but it emphasizes the role of 
actors, particularly those of firms and governments. 
Lee and Lim (2001) explained that several choices are available for possible entry or catch-up 
strategies by latecomers, such as path-following, stage-skipping, and path-creating, in which the path 
refers to the trajectory of technologies and stage represents the stages in the trajectories. 
The first choice is to adopt the first-generation or oldest technology with the lowest prices; this 
method is called path-following. This strategy implies that latecomers move along the old technical 
trajectories of incumbents. An advantage of this strategy is that the established firms care less about 
the transfer or leakages of proprietary technologies because latecomers target and want to purchase 
the oldest technologies readily available at low prices, particularly during business downturns. The 
late entry by Korean firms in the shipbuilding industry can be considered path-following backed up 
by the government to seek its survival as a late entrant. 
The second choice is stage-skipping, which refers to the case in which latecomer firms follow the 
same path as that of incumbents, but skip older-generation technology to adopt the latest technology. 
Thus, fierce competition may occur between incumbents and late entrants because the latter fully 
utilizes the advantage of latecomers to adopt up-to-date technology. Aside from the matter of 
available financial resources to purchase up-to-date technology, the market availability of such an 
up-to-date technology or the willingness of any established firm to transfer such technologies to 








benefit a late entrant, this firm may emerge as a powerful rival because it does not only enjoy the 
same level of productivity as the incumbent, but it utilizes the likely low costs of labor or other factor 
conditions as well. Government assistance in the form of industrial policy is an additional advantage. 
The third choice pertains to path-creation, an aggressive and risk-taking strategy. This strategy 
refers to the case in which a latecomer explores its own path of technological development by using 
a new techno-economic paradigm or a new generation of technologies (Lee and Lim 2001). This 
strategy is consistent with the idea of leapfrogging discussed by Perez and Soete (1988), who 
observed that leapfrogging may occur during the shifting in generations or paradigms of technologies. 
An obvious advantage of path-creation or leapfrogging is that this strategy chooses technologies with 
high long-term potential or productivity, whereas a potential risk is that the emerging or new 
technology is neither stable nor reliable; such technology also has low productivity or high costs at 
its early stage (Lee et al., 2005). 
The preceding idea is consistent with the theory of S-curves (Chandy and Tellis 1998; Foster 
1986), which states that the inferiority of a new technology at its first appearance discourages 
incumbents from introducing the new generation of technology. In this sense, a new technology can 
be a source of the “incumbent trap” and is a window of opportunity for latecomers who are free from 
the “replacement effect of new technology” (Arrow 1962). In other words, incumbent firms tend to 
ignore, by rational calculation or mistake, the emerging technologies with potential, and they remain 
complacent with high productivity from current technologies. Although this choice may be rational 
in the short run, incumbent firms may lose to other firms that take the risk of adopting emerging 
technologies and eventually attain higher productivity than that of incumbents, thereby winning the 
market from incumbents. Nonetheless, not every firm, but probably late entrants or inferior firms 
whose levels of productivity are lower than those of the leading firm, has many reasons to shift 
rapidly and lightly to new technologies. In this sense, latecomers have a greater incentive than the 
incumbents to take the risk of adopting new technologies.  








leadership changes in various sectors. In this case, this study further modifies the theoretical 
framework of Lee and Malerba (2016a) to consider a new dimension of the incumbent trap. 
Specifically, this study proposes that the incumbent trap may also result from the institutional rigidities 
or legacies of firms in addition to the relative costs and benefits of new versus old technologies that are 
associated with theory of S-curve or replacement effects. This modification is applied because the trap 
in the shift of leadership from the UK to Japan resulted from the institutional rigidity in the UK (i.e., 
the resistance of UK labor unions against new technologies), whereas that from Japan to Korea is 
associated with the institutional memory of depression and the rigidity in the government’s regulations 
on investments which discouraged Japanese firms from investing in new technologies and facilities for 
large vessels. 
In the discussion of the catch-up strategies of latecomers, technologies are treated as exogenous, 
and firms, especially latecomer firms, are treated as if they face the binary choice to adopt such 
strategies or not. However, latecomers often not only assimilate the adopted technologies but also 
improve them substantially, an approach that is often called follow-on innovation, incremental 
innovations, or reinvention. Rogers (2003) observed that reinvention occurs at the implementation 
stage for many innovations and adopters, and it leads to an increased rate of adoption of an 
innovation. Along this line of thought, we can conceive two types of path-creation; one depends on 
whether a new path is created by in-house, endogenous innovation activities by the latecomers, and 
the second adopts the exogenous or supplier-driven innovation earlier than the incumbents do and 
then further improving the adopted technologies. The former may be common in product innovation 
or IT sectors, such as semiconductors, whereas the latter may be relevant in process innovation-prone 
sectors, such as steel (Lee and Ki 2016), and can be pertained to as the adoption and follow-on 
innovation mode. 
Our hypothesis shown in Section 4 is based on our understanding of the technological and market 
regimes or the demand condition of the shipbuilding industry discussed in Section 3. We hypothesize 








applicable to the leadership change in the shipbuilding industry from UK to Japanese firms in the 
1950s when different attitudes and speed of adopting new technologies between the firms in two 
countries served as the critical factor for the market shake-up. This study hypothesizes that the 
window of opportunity for Japan to forge ahead of the UK was the arrival of new technologies, a 
method called welding block, and that the Japanese strategy was a path-creating strategy of adopting 
such innovations more rapidly than the incumbent UK did that delayed the adoption because of the 
opposition of labor unions. The path-creation by the Japanese firms was along the mode of adoption 
and follow-on innovation as explained in the latter part of the paper. 
In Section 5, the leadership shift from Japan to Korea is hypothesized as path-creation because 
the Korean firms developed the “extended 3D CAD system” more quickly than the Japanese firms 
did, which enabled the former to meet the newly rising demand in large vessels. Thus, the first 
window of opportunity for the Korean firms was the shift in CAD technology: (i) a shift from the 
traditional 2D CAD to a breakthrough in 3D CAD, which was developed by specialized software 
suppliers in Europe and the US (Rando 2002) and can provide the graphical 3D representation of 
numerical data; (ii) systematization of 3D CAD, allowing it to be linked to other software and 
databases. The Korean path-creation can also be considered an adoption and follow-on innovation 
mode because Korean companies not only adopted the 3D CAD design technology, but also created 
an integrated 3D CAD system by collaborating with leading foreign companies in their in-house 
R&D, integrating the design systems (e.g., outfit (interior designs) and hull design (structure of the 
ship)), and consolidating the design software with ERP and other databases. The second window of 
opportunity was the shift in demand conditions or the rise of demand for sophisticated vessels of 
large sizes, the production of which can also be improved with 3D CAD. 
Compared with Korean firms, the Japanese firms were stuck into the incumbent trap of 
remaining with the “unextended 3D CAD system” because of their slow response to accommodate 
the 3D CAD technology and their decision not to invest in upgraded facilities (e.g., large docks) to 








to purchase new technologies, particularly from Western suppliers who remained the major suppliers 
of these systems, because of their “overconfidence in their abilities and a lack of confidence in their 
ability to work with foreign companies,” which has “a negative influence on implementing more 
extensive changes” in the shipbuilding process. An additional factor for the passive attitude of 
Japanese toward new investment was the macroeconomic environment of the rapid appreciation of 
the Japanese currency and the past trauma of deep depression in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
3. Record of the Leadership Changes 
 
In terms of the technological regime, the shipbuilding sector is a complex product system (CoPS) 
industry (Hobday, Rush and Tidd 2000) with a slow pace of technical change, compared with that of 
the information, communication, and technology sector. This difference implies that if any window 
of opportunity emerges from the technology side, it should be not only component technologies but 
eventually in the form of the changes in systematized technology that may change the entire process 
of building ships. In addition, the shipbuilding industry calls for large capital investment for 
manufacturing and employment of numerous employees. This condition implies that even with the 
emergence of new technologies, incumbent firms would be less likely to invest in new technologies 
because of the high sunk cost of the capital goods. 
In terms of the market regime or demand condition, the ship building sector corresponds to 
longer cycle time with the longer life expectancy of ships than typical consumer goods, as well as 
market demand influenced by the general business cycles of economies. In addition, the ship 
industry’s market is characterized by i) a highly competitive global market because of the bidding 
system developed by many buyers and sellers as well as the relatively low transportation costs (Porter, 
1986), and ii) customers are active purchasers, giving out specifications on the products to be made. 
Intense interaction is required during ship development to meet the customer request. 








wooden ship dominated the shipbuilding industry in the first half of the 19th century, but the UK 
became the leader in the latter half of the same century. After World War II, in the late 1950s, the 
leadership was shifted to Japan, but was eventually obtained by the Korean firms in the 2000s although 
they are seriously challenged recently by Chinese firms. 
Between the early 1900s and the end of World War II, the demand slowly grew until it fluctuated 
corresponding to war. After the war, the demand grew rapidly until the middle of the 1970s (the period 
when Japan was able to capture leadership) and suddenly declined. The growth in demand gradually 
recovered from the early 1990s, reaching the level of the later 1970s during the latter part of the 1990s, 
along with continued growth in the 2000s (see Figure 1). Since the early 1900s, the demand for 
military vessels declined, whereas that for commercial vessels increased and the size of vessels have 
been enlarged, calling for large shipbuilding facilities. After World War II, in the realm of commercial 
vessels, new types of vessels, such as crude oil carriers, containers, LNG gas carriers, and offshore 
plant, emerged. 
Changes have also been implemented in the building method from rivet, welding (methods of 
building ship surfaces), to block building (method of building separate blocks and completing ships by 
linking blocks). From the 1970s, the production process has been digitized, controlled by computers, 
software, and microelectronics components for automatic mechanical operation via 
computer-controlled welding robots and production control methods. From the 1980s, the design 
process has also been digitized through the emergence of design software (i.e., CAD) and 
complementary software (e.g., computer aided engineering (CAE) and simulation software). 
This study focuses on the leadership shift in the industry from UK to Japan and from Japan to 
Korea in terms of production volume. The Japanese surpassed the UK in the mid-1950s, in which the 
former occupied 26.2% of the market share in 1956, whereas the UK shipbuilders only comprised 
20.7%. Roughly 40 years earlier, in 1913, the Japanese shipbuilders remained at 2.0%, whereas the UK 
shipbuilders occupied the dominant market share (58%) (Table 1, Figure 1). In the 2000s, Korea 








Japanese shipbuilders comprised only 18.3%. Roughly 40 years earlier, the Korean shipbuilders 
occupied only 2.4%, whereas the Japanese shipbuilders occupied the dominant market share (40.9%) 
in 1976 (Table 2, See Figure 1).  
 
TABLE 1. Ships manufactured in the UK and Japan (1913–1968) 
(in percentage of gross tons) 
 World UK Japan 
1913 100.0 58.0 2.0 
1921 100.0 35.4 5.2 
1924 100.0 64.1 3.2 
1927 100.0 54.6 1.9 
1930 100.0 51.9 5.3 
1933 100.0 27.3 15.4 
1936 100.0 40.9 14.1 
1939 100.0 25.3 13.1 
1950 100.0 29.5 7.8 
1953 100.0 25.8 10.9 
1956 100.0 20.7 26.2 
1959 100.0 15.7 19.7 
1962 100.0 12.8 26.1 
1965 100.0 8.8 43.9 
1968 100.0 5.3 50.8 
Source: Blumenthal (1976)  
 
 
TABLE 2. Ships manufactured in Japan and Korea (1976–2012)  
 (in percentage of gross tons) 








1976 100.0  40.9  2.4  
1979 100.0  32.9  3.5  
1982 100.0  48.5  8.3  
1985 100.0  52.3  14.4  
1988 100.0  37.0  29.1  
1991 100.0  45.3  21.7  
1994 100.0  43.9  21.4  
1997 100.0  39.1  32.4  
2000 100.0  38.5  39.1  
2003 100.0  35.2  38.3  
2006 100.0  34.9  36.4  
2009 100.0  24.7  37.8  



























Source: Lloyd’s  
 
4. Explaining the Leadership Shift from the UK to Japan 
 
The shipbuilders’ production volume in Japan was recorded as the highest in the world in the 
latter part of the 1950s. This volume was realized through the adoption of the windows of 
opportunity in market and technology. Japan had retained its leading position until 1999. 
 
4.1 Exploiting the new window of opportunity of forging ahead: utilization of welding block 
Japan first constructed a modern shipyard in 1853 and built its first steel ship in 1890 (610 gross 
tons). Japan ranked as the third nation in terms of shipbuilding construction in 1917 (350,000 gross 
ton construction) (KOSHIPA 2010). Japanese shipyards were equipped with the facility to meet 
domestic demand, comprising 50 shipyards with 126 berths and 75 docks (Chida and Davies, 1990). 
The excess capacity of Japanese shipbuilders along with their accumulated capabilities enabled firms 
to meet this demand. After World War II, the demand expanded for Japanese ships, initially domestic, 
the majority of which were destroyed during the war. The domestic demand accounted for 85.2% of 
orders of all ships constructed from 1950 to 1954. Japan needed ships to support its import and 
export of capital goods, components, and raw materials for industrialization. 
The demand increased further in the latter half of the 1950s, particularly after the Suez Crisis 
built in 1956. The 1960s and 1970s were periods when low-priced and abundant amounts of oil 
supported the industrialization of the world economy and when trade volume expanded with the free 
trade trend. The physical volume of international trade rose from 2% per year from 1920 to 1938 to 
8.2% in the post-war period because of the expansion of trade and the industrialization of the 
recovering advanced countries and other developing countries (Blumenthal 1976). This expansion of 
trade increased the demand for ships, especially for oil tankers and bulk carriers. The increase of oil 








demand for bulk carriers reflected the demand for international trade. Large standard vessels were 
increasingly accepted in international markets, which allowed competitive advantage for non-UK 
shipbuilders that used the ‘bureaucratic method’ suitable for the large-scale production of standard 
vessels (Lorenz 1991; Kirby 1992; Motora, 1997). 
Over this expansion period, the Japanese government helped local shipyards by giving them a 
protected market and providing them with supportive policy measures. The government had a policy 
for nurturing the shipbuilding industry, establishing the shipbuilding law in 1950. This law protected 
the domestic market, and sought various means to nurture the industry. The Japanese government 
decided how many ships were to be constructed using loans from the Development Bank of Japan, 
which provided long-term low interest loans to shipbuilding companies (Blumenthal, 1976). Other 
policies were also implemented to reduce the cost burden of shipyards, such as temporary measures 
pertaining to the reduction of steel cost in shipbuilding (August 1953 to March 1954) and providing 
2.5% reduced loans (originally 5%) to steel makers to reduce the cost of steel (RIMSE 2002). A 
policy was also in place to link ship exports with imports of crude sugar (January 1953 to November 
1954) to compensate for the export revenues by supporting profits from the import of sugar by up to 
20% of the ship’s price along with long-term low interest loans for exports (from 1950) and export 
credit insurance (from 1950) (RIMSE, 2002). Given the rising domestic demand and supportive 
governmental policies, the Japanese shipyards initially seized market opportunities from their 
capacity and accumulated capability to keep pace with the leading country. 
Japan also utilized new technological opportunities to seize the rising demand. When the welding 
block method was introduced first in the US as new way of building commercial vessels, Japanese 
shipyards soon began to adopt this method in 1950. However, at that time, the method was yet to be 
widely used in manufacturing commercial vessels. The US had fully developed the block building 
and structural welding methods (Chida, 1990), which have been applied mostly in military vessels, 
having not fulfilled their full potential. Japanese shipbuilders had led the application of the block 








government who supported the projects to solve problems in the application of welding block 
methods.  
The productivity of the welding method was substantially improved with the automatic welding 
method invested in by the Japanese shipbuilders. The automatic welding technology called for 
complementary goods: steel that can be welded together with the automatic welding machine. The 
steel and shipbuilding industries in Japan worked collaboratively from 1951 to 1952, which resulted 
in creating such steel (Blumenthal, 1976). The developed steel was fine quality “killed” steel rather 
than “rimmed” steel (Chida and Davies, 1990). The welding method called for other complementary 
goods, precise cutting machines for plates, and development of improved welding rods. Automatic 
gas cutting was introduced in 1951 (Motora, 1997). Factory layouts and facilities had also to be 
accordingly changed, following the introduction of the building block methods. Given that the 
welding block method facilitated the prefabrication of blocks indoors, the shipyard needed rail cranes 
to move blocks to the berth (Lorentz 1991). The shipyard did not have to have infrastructure for the 
riveting method, in which the sections of the hull were constructed on a job shop basis and then fitted 
piece by piece at the berth (Lorenz 1991). This flexibility led to a straight-line organization of 
production, which was bureaucratic (Lorentz 1991).  
With the adoption of welding block methods, all these interdependent changes amounted to a 
total revolution in shipbuilding. For example, the welding of thick iron and steel plates cannot be 
introduced without automatic cutting. The welding block method cannot be efficient without changes 
in the shipyard layout (Blumenthal 1976, p.157). Japanese shipbuilders achieved all these changes, 
which became the basis of the long-term competitiveness of the Japanese shipbuilding industry. 
From 1950 to 1955, with this new method, the Japanese shipyards successfully delivered ships with 
shorter lead times without interruptions from trade unions. With such a disciplined labor force, the 
Japanese firms adopted bureaucratic shipbuilding methods with capital-intensive modern facilities, 
as in the case of other successful non-UK European shipyards (Lorentz 1991), to overcome its 








deadweight tons tanker in 164 days as opposed to the UK’s 281 days in 1950–1955 (Kaneko, 1964). 
Productivity was considerably improved through the welding block method. For example, the period 
spent on shipbuilding berth/dock was reduced from 10 months in 1949 to 5 months in 1960. The 
maximum utilization of the berth/dock (including large capital investment) was crucial to the 
improvement of productivity. 
One caveat on the price competitiveness of Japanese ships is that the wage advantage was not 
automatically guaranteed. The cost of the locally built ships, despite cheap wages, was higher than 
that of the UK because of expensive imported steel. In 1956, because of a 62% higher cost of 
material costs (imported materials), the cost of a ship built by Japanese shipbuilders were 27% higher 
than that of the UK (Blementhal, 1976). The cost could become cheaper than that of the UK’s only 
after the local production of the necessary steel in Japan. Finally,from 1959 onward, Japanese 
shipbuilders managed to achieve a cost advantage (3% cheaper) over UK shipbuilders 
(Kaneko,1964). 
After being successfully positioned as the leader monopolizing the largest demand of the world’s 
shipbuilding, Japan continuously invested in creating original technologies. After more than 15 years 
of investment to reduce the gap between Japan and Western countries as well as in-house R&D for 
original technology, Japanese yards began to develop original technologies by themselves in 1960s 
(Chida and Davies, 1990), such as developing the world’s largest tanker Nissho Maru in 1962, 
Tokyo Maru in 1965, and Idemitsu Maru in 1966 (Cho and Porter, 1986). With its mastery of block 
building methods and its capability to create original ships and design concepts with low wages, 
Japanese shipbuilders successfully established the basis of strong competiveness in the shipbuilding 
industry that lasted for 30 years. 
UK companies failed to cope with the competition from Japanese shipbuilders because the UK 
firms’ traditional craft system of building nonstandard vessels as well as the established labor unions 
served as a barrier against adoptin the new bureaucratic system (Lorentz 1991; Kirby 1992) and to 








method because the work done by four workers in the old rivet method can be accomplished by one 
worker in the new method (Cho and Porter, 1996). While the UK was delayed in adopting the new 
method, competitive advantage had shifted toward the new methods during the postwar boom in 
demand (Lorenz 1991). 
 
5. Explaining Leadership Shift from Japan to Korea 
5.1 Entry by government activism 
The Korean government drove the country’s entry into the large shipbuilding industry by 
industrial policy. In 1973, the policy for the shipbuilding industry, including the plan to build three 
shipyards that can produce million-ton ships by 1976, was declared. Large Korean firms, which did 
not have any experience in building ships, entered the market. However, this was not considered 
rational by foreign experts. The Japanese government inspecting group, which provided government 
loans, concluded that large shipyards cannot be constructed in Korea (Hyundai Heavy Industry, 
1992). The CEO (Mr. Chung) of a Chaebol firm (Hyundai) under the support of the government 
repeatedly failed in securing loans from foreign financial institutions although he managed to get the 
loan by securing a first customer in spite of the fact that the company’s dock for shipbuilding was yet 
to be built (Lee and Park, 2013). 
The government’s drive toward the shipbuilding industry was a part of the heavy and chemical 
industry promotion policy, which aimed to make the shipbuilding industry an export industry. The 
policy provided shipbuilding and other preferred sectors with (i) financial incentives, (ii) 
complementary investments, (iii) trade incentives, and (iv) tax holidays. Financial incentives 
included preferential rates from state-owned banks with low nominal rates. The government’s 
complementary investments were one form of incentives that covered large infrastructure programs 
for new facilities. The government invested in industrial complexes for shipbuilding in Ulsan, Okpo, 
and Chukdo (KSA, 2005).The government also protected the domestic market, and the shipbuilding 








However, the protection policy was not considerably significant because the local market volume 
was very small such that the provision of the local market did not provide a solid cradle market for 
Korean shipbuilders, who considered the export market a major market. Export loans were also 
enacted in 1976 (KOSHIPA, 2012) that provided loans for shipbuilding for export. 
The Korean government emphasized the importance of local delivery of materials and 
components for shipbuilding. The state-owned Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation has been nurtured 
as part of the government’s heavy and chemical industry policy (Lee and Ki 2015). The government 
also implemented policy measures for raising the ratio of locally manufactured components 
(KOSHIPA, 2005). In the case of engines, if the quality of the locally developed components was 
beyond a designated level, then the import of the engine component was banned (KOSHIPA, 2005). 
The localized component that had high implications regarding technology and economic effects was 
given financial and administrative support (KOSHIPA, 2005). 
Several chaebols initially entered the shipbuilding business, with the first in 1974, or 
immediately before the global downturn after the oil shock. Nonetheless, these firms continued to 
invest during the 1980s. The investment made by Hyundai Heavy Industries and Samsung Heavy 
Industries was driven by the visions of their respective CEOs to become one of the largest 
shipbuilders in the global market (Hong, 2004). The downturn market was a challenge for the 
Korean firms, who had newly entered the industry. The companies attempted to survive the 
downturn market by bidding the lowest price on the basis of its cost advantage based on low wages 
and low currency value. The firms’ investment was allotted to build a shipyard for building large 
vessels to capture the current and forecasted market demand. In a sense, the Korean large 
shipbuilders skipped the stage of building ships using berths but jumped to the stage using docks. In 
other words, the Korean firms invested primarily in a modern building dock, which is a type of 
graving dock or basin usually built of concrete, in which ships are constructed and then floated out 
after the dock is flooded. In comparison, a berth is a structure located on the shore of a sea, a river, or 








(VLCCs) in 1972–1975 and four other docks in 1977–1979 (KOSHIPA, 2005). Daewoo shipbuilding 
completed one dock with one million tons, and Samsung constructed one dock with 150,000 tons in 
1979 and one with 250,000 tons in 1983. Thus, Korea managed to come up with the most modern 
docks and layouts in the world. With the continued investment on modern docks, Korean companies 
could have more number of large docks than Japan in 2005(Table 3). 
 
 
TABLE 3. Comparison of the number of shipbuilding facility in Korea and Japan   
 
1985 1995 2005 
Country Total Large facility 
docks (more than 
300 m) 
Total Large facility 
docks (more 
than 300 m) 
Total Large facility 
docks (more 
than 300 m) 
Korea 46 7 47 8 47 19 
Japan 269 11 223 9 195 11 
Note: Shipbuilding facility means the number of building berths and docks. Berths are on-land space for building ships. In modern 
shipbuilding, building berths have been replaced by docks.  
Source: Kim (2010) 
 
Korean firms adopted a path-following strategy of importing foreign technology and using 
low-price strategies, thereby undercutting the competition in the 1980s. These firms expanded the 
country’s market share through aggressive marketing. Korean companies invested in learning 
production technology such as front-loaded outfitting, pallet management, and management of 
supply information (Lee and Park 2013). Korean firms also invested in improving their productivity 
to reduce the cost (KOSHIPA, 2005), challenged themselves to develop high-value added vessels 
and offshore plants, and diversified into new businesses. Korean firms began to develop high-value 








(Lee and Park 2013). Korean companies expanded their market share by investing in learning foreign 
technology, resulting in imitative shipbuilding between the 1970s and 1980s. The downturn provided 
good conditions to obtain access to foreign sources of knowledge. In the 1980s, European firms 
suffered from the downturn market and declining competitiveness, and they were therefore forced to 
sell their technology in better condition than that from Japan (Lee and Park 2013, p. 150). 
 
5.2 Forging ahead by path-creation in the 2000s 
In the 1990s, Korea had windows of opportunity in market and technology: expansion of demand 
for large vessels and systematization of 3D CAD. From the 1990s, the demand trend became an 
upturn in the market. This shift involved the rise of the replacement demand for outdated ships and 
also for the substitution of the existing demand due to the regulation on sea pollution, resulting in the 
requirements of the International Maritime Organization to produce double hull ships in 1993. The 
increase in demand was led by large oil tankers and bulk carriers. Further demands stemmed from 
large gas containers, other large specialized ships, and offshore plants to develop energy in the sea 
that called for large locks and large spaces. These changes in demand were an important window of 
opportunity for Korean firms. In turn, these firms invested aggressively in new facilities for large 
vessels by investing in large docks in the 1990s. This upturn lasted until the end of the 2000s, which 
lasted longer than the expected date of the international forecast experts (interview senior executive 
of KOSHIPA, 24 January 2014). 
The increase of Korean firms’ global market share was facilitated by their capacity to seize the 
rapidly expanding demands in large oil tankers as well as gas and chemical carriers and containers. 
From 1995 to 2005, the global production volume of oil tankers more than doubled (from 5.5 to 13.6 
billion gross tons), the volume of gas and chemical carriers almost quintupled (from 1.1 to 5.5 billion 
gross tons), and that for containers tripled (from 3.3 to 10.0 billion gross tons). Contrarily, the 
production for other vessels was less than doubled.  Korean firms took the bigger shares in the 








production and existence of large vessels, which call for modern docks with more than 300 m length 
(Lee and Park, 2013, p. 111). 
 
TABLE 4 Market shares of ships completed during 2005 by category(1,000 gross tons)  
 EU Japan Korea Total Total 
  (%)  (%)  (%) (%)  
Oil tankers 28,380 0 3,780,744 28 7,428,484 55 100 13,625,165 
Bulk carries 8,685,104 1 8,685,104 72 444,780 4 100 12,105,366 
Gas and chemical 118,219 0 1,090,682 20 3,494,158 64 100 5,452,449 
General cargo 180,406 0 323,737 29 69,124 6 100 1,109,682 
Container 1,716,835 0 987,225 10 5,711,334 57 100 9,999,953 
Total 3,140,573 0 16,191,935 35 17,686,860 38 100 46,507,208 
Source: Lloyd’s 
 
Regarding this increased market share, KOSHIPA (2005) stated that the competitiveness of 
Korean shipyards was estimated to be inferior to that of Japan in basic design and production 
technology, but is superior in detailed design and production design (KOSHIPA 2005, p. 267). Such 
superiority is derived from the design flexibility. Korea’s main products, such as large oil tankers 
and gas and chemical carriers and containers, are ships that call for design customization by close 
interaction with customers. The emerging trend of the systematization of 3D CAD allowed Korean 
firms to enhance their design flexibility. In particular, the “extended 3D CAD system” enabled 
Korean shipbuilding companies to be flexible in the design of ships to be built. Such flexibility was 
achieved by design customization strategy, which aimed to thoroughly accomdate the requests of 
customers before and after the contract without planned standardized vessels (Chinnery, 1993). This 
system was developed by combining the imported software and databases as well as the software and 
databases made in-house or by local suppliers. 
The technological trajectory of CAD that emerged in the latter part of 1990s was the change of 








the extension of functions and others approaches. Since then, CAD evolved from being a simple 
2D/3D drafting tool “for drafting and data transfer” into an “extended 3D CAD system” that 
radically changed the design process (Nobeoka and Baba 1999). This new technology offered a 3D 
model that can become a platform to integrate all related operations from the system level 
perspective for real concurrent engineering: (i) extension of functions to check the validity of designs 
(i.e., CAE simulations and digital prototypes) and interface with other systems (e.g., ERP and PDM) 
of a company for shared databases that facilitate communication between design, production 
planning, and production control; (ii) integration of designs created with different kinds of software; 
and (iii) integration of the design with computer-aided manufacturing (Nobeoka and Baba 1999). 
From the late 1990s to 2000s, in response to the technological trend, Korean companies not only 
imported 3D CAD design technology in an agile manner, but they also created their own “extended 
3D CAD system” by collaborating with leading foreign companies and in-house R&D to integrate 
the design systems (e.g., outfit (interior designs) and hull design (structure of the ship) as well as the 
design software with ERP and other databases). The “extended 3D CAD system” of the Korean 
companies was the most advanced because they cooperated with leading CAD suppliers worldwide 
and forged ahead to integrate the CAD software and link the CAD system with other databases. This 
approach may be considered a “follow-on innovation” as a variant of path-creating innovation (Lee 
and Ki 2015). 
One example of a company’s “extended 3D CAD system” is Daewoo shipbuilding (DSME)’s 
DACOS. This system was developed in 2002, incorporating Tribon and CADDS, both imported 
software, for hull (started using 1989) and outfit designs (1983), respectively. DACOS includes 99 
application modules for the modeling and automatic generation of blueprints and is connected to the 
ERP system. The integrated system incorporating the offshore plant design was completed in 2004 
and was the most advanced integrated CAD system in Korea (Kim, 2008). With the extended 3D 
CAD system, shipbuilders no longer have to go through trials and errors because of the enabled 








departments such as design and production. Shipbuilders can also quickly change the designs and 
reflect these changes in the detailed design for manufacturing. This undertaking reduces the time for 
customizing vessel designs, for instance, reducing designing effort-hours to less than half (Kim, 
2008). This “extended system” granted Korean shipbuilders with a competitive advantage.  
In addition, the design flexibility that utilizes the 3D CAD system was secured from investment 
in human resources, including design engineers. Such flexibility was achieved by a rich pool of 
engineers equipped with advanced 3D CAD systems and who can make customized design (Lee and 
Park, 2013). In 2006, Korea’s pool of design human resources was summed up to 8,000, which were 
greater, or four times bigger, than that of Japan.3 The lower wages in Korea were also one source of 
advantage, as the Japanese wages were 1.5 times higher than that of the Korean wages in 2002 
(POSRI data as cited in KOSHIPA 2005, p. 262). The Korean workforce thus contributed to the 
country’s gain of price competitiveness in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
The “extended CAD system” supported the improvement or innovation in shipbuilding methods. 
In the 2000s, Korean shipmakers developed the frontier process of building and launching a ship. 
The size of blocks was enlarged so that a ship can be made by erecting seven to eight blocks. The 
block building method has been advanced to mega blocks, reducing the number of blocks to five, and 
terablocks, with only two blocks (KOSHIPA, 2010). The tandem block method allows two ships to 
be constructed in tandem in the same dock. The block building method calls for the investment in 
large cranes (Lee and Park, 2013; KOSHIPA, 2005). These block methods are supported by the 3D 
CAD system, allowing companies to check the design errors of separate blocks before the erection of 
separate blocks by examining the 3D designs and simulated data.4 According to an interviewee, 
“previously, when the blocks were erected and fitted together, some of the subtle difference of the 
design of components had to be cut away. But, nowadays there is almost no such occasion due to the 
advancement of CAD, CAE and simulation technology, besides the advancement of pricintness of 
the CNC machine works.” The large building block technology, one of the innovations made by 
Korean shipbuilders, has been been able to be implemented owing to the consolidation of the CAD 
3 Interview with Jeonghan Lee at DSME in Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (2006). 

















system (see Table 5 for various innovations by the Korean shipbuilding industy) . 
 
Table 5. Innovations by Korean Shipbuilders 
Innovations Year 
World's Largest Block Manufacturing Technology 2002 
World's First On-land Shipbuilding Technology 2005 
Ship-Bow's Underwater Assembly and Mounting Technology 2005 
Skid Launching System Utilizing Building Technology 2007 
Korea's First Medium-Sized Marine Diesel Engine 2000 
LNG Re-Liquefaction System Technology 2007 
LNG Re-Gasification Vessel 2003 
Arctic Ice-Breaking Oil Tanker 2006 
Source: The Korea Shipbuilders Association (2009)  
 
 
5.3 The Incumbent Trap in Japan  
In the face of upturn demand with new types of vessel (large sophisticated vessels), the already 
invested production facilities in Japan served as a lock-in condition that deterred investment in 
building large docks greater than 300 m. For example, the investment in Japanese shipyards 
equipped with building berths cannot be as aggressive as that of Korean companies who invested in 
building large docks from 1980s to 2000s. In addition, given the historical memory of the very weak 
demand during the downturn in the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese industry faced a kind of 
‘institutional’ barrier against aggressive investment. The government regulations set up for the 
survival of the Japanese firms during the recession in the 1980s included the regulations on the total 
tonnage, scrap and build, parallel building method, and VLCC dock. These regulations lasted until 
late 1996 (KOSHIPA 2010, p. 15) and prevented firms from investing in new production facilities. 








market demand and were reluctant to invest in facilities to capture such demand. An example of the 
conservative forecasting in 1995 was the forecast by the Japanese Shipowners’ Association about the 
average annual global demand which was only “about 20 million’ gross tons (GT) between 1996 and 
2005  (Japanese Shipbuilders’ Association 1996), which was 2 to 5 million GT less than the 
forecasted by the equivalent Korean organization (Korea Shipbuilder’s Association, 1996). The 
forecast over the next three years indicated a similar difference (Korea Shipbuilder’s Association 
1998). All these conditions prevented the Japanese shipyards from making timely investment for the 
upturn market with new types of demand, especially sophisticated vessels larger than the previously 
constructed ones.  
Japanese firms were also lock-in in the old technology system, not offering design flexibility 
necessary for large sophisticated vessels. The firms were reluctant to set up the “extended” 3D CAD 
system essential to secure design flexibility (Nobeoka and Baba 1999). Until the 1990s, Japanese 
shipyards, who used to develop in-house 2D CAD software that was as good or even better than that 
made by other software developers in the 1970s to 1980s, had the most advanced processes in 
designing ships, adopting in-house developed CAD, or purchased CAD (Nobeoka and Baba 2009 ; 
Interview). At this time, 2D CAD did affect the process change of traditional drafting processes. 
However, the 3D CAD that reflects the breakthroughs in technology (graphical 3D representation of 
numerical data) achieved by specialized software suppliers in Europe and the US (Rando 2002) 
became a complex networked technology that uses 3D CAD models (Nobeoka and Baba 1999). In 
the 1980s, the 3D CAD technology, including solid modeling, mathematical representation of 
freeform surfaces, and parametric modeling, was developed and advanced by Western companies 
such as MAGI, Silicon Graphics, and Pro/Engineer. Such technology was substantially different 
from 2D CAD technology. 3D CAD has been extensively utilized in the automobile industry and was 
relatively diffused slowly to the shipbuilding industry in the 1990s.  
The leading Japanese shipyards faced a problem in responding to the changes. Engineers in the 








who remained the major suppliers of these systems, because of “overconfidence in their abilities and 
a lack of confidence in their ability to work with foreign companies,” which has “a negative 
influence on implementing more extensive changes in the shipbuilding process” (Nobeoka and Baba 
1999). The Japanese also tried to develop their own 3D CAD technology. However, given that such 
technology was substantially different from the existing 2D CAD but failed to create the 3D 
technology equivalent to that supplied by the Western suppliers, (Nobeoka and Baba 1999). The 
Japanese shipyards had also not been investing in human resources for the new information systems. 
Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki shipyard and machinery employed 300 designers, 100 production engineers, 
20 software systems support, and 30 to 40 factory automation personnel, and these 50 to 60 software 
and automation personnel were scheduled for downsizing by the time of evaluation of the 1996 




This study considers the shipbuilding industry to explain the successive changes in leadership. The 
key concepts in the explanations are the windows of opportunity, as well as the incumbent trap and 
path-creation which are used to express different responses by the incumbent and latecomers. The 
window of opportunity for Japan to forge ahead of the UK was the arrival of new technologies, 
including welding block. In particular, the Japanese adopted path-creation by using innovations more 
promptly than the incumbent UK, which delayed their adoption due to the opposition of labor unions. 
The leadership shift from Japan to Korea is also a form of path-creation because the Korean firms 
responded quickly to the rise of a new window of opportunity (systematized 3D CAD technologies) 
and were able to meet the newly rising demand in large vessels that was the second window of 
opportunity. The Korean path-creation can also be considered an adoption and follow-on innovation 
mode because Korean companies not only adopted the 3D CAD design technology, but also created an 








and by integrating the design systems (e.g., outfit (interior designs) and hull design (structure of the 
ship) with other software in the ERP, databases, procurement, and manufacturing. Compared with 
Korean firms, the Japanese firms were stuck into the incumbent trap of remaining with the 
“unextended 3D CAD system” and opted not to invest in upgraded facilities (e.g., large docks) to build 
large vessels because of the appreciation of the Japanese currency and the past trauma of the deep 
depression in the 1970s and 1980s. 
While we consider this sector as another case of the technology window playing key roles, one of 
the interesting and new findings of this study is the unique, institutional nature of the source of the 
incumbent trap in the shipbuilding industry. This study determines that the incumbent trap occurred 
in this sector because of institutional rigidities or legacies of the firms, which is in contrast to the 
sectors covered in Lee and Malerba (2016b) where the source of the trap was in relative costs and 
benefits of new versus old technologies, associated with the theory of S-curve or replacement effects. 
In the shift leadership from the UK to Japan, the rigidity was the resistance of the UK labor unions 
against new technologies, whereas the legacy in the shift from Japan to Korea was the institutional 
memory of the depression that discouraged Japanese firms from investing in new technologies and 
facilities for large vessels as well as a rigidity in government regulation on the investment by the 
firms in the sector. Given that incumbent countries tend to age and accumulate additional 
institutional rigidities over time, the shipbuilding cases underscore the need to consider the source of 
the incumbent trap broader factors, including not only the economic or rational calculations but the 
institutional and non-rational dimensions as well. 
In the meantime, the peculiarity of the technological regimes of the shipbuilding sector and the 
associated unique nature of the technological window of opportunity are also noted. Lee and Malerba 
(2016b) indicated that instead of every innovation, only a certain type of it may serve as the window 
of opportunity that may lead to leadership change, distinguishing destructive or 
competence-destroying innovations from competence-enhancing innovations (Christensen 1997; 








2000), and the window of opportunity from the technology side came from a systematized 
technology that may change the entire process of building ships. In the case of Japan, the welding 
block method was not about the technical change of the specific design of ships, but was about the 
entire process of shipbuilding. In the case of Korea, the introduction of 3D CAD was not the final 
solution but was used to consolidate a new system of designing and “real concurrent engineering” by 
integrating the drafting software with other software for digital assembly, ERP, procurement, 
simulation, data transfer to manufacturing, and shared databases (Nobeoka and Baba 1999). 
The above findings may offer some implications for Korean shipbuilding firms that are currently 
assuming leadership positions yet are also suffering from one of the most serious crises associated 
with the global downturn and the rise of Chinese shipbuilders. First, given the cyclical nature of the 
business, the past experiences of Japan reveal that any restructuring measures implemented during 
the current downturn must be carefully designed to prevent permanent damage to the core 
competence of firms. Moreover, the government must avoid introducing any regulations that may 
increase the level of institutional rigidities to private sectors that will respond to the changing market 
conditions in the future. Second, as the current leaders, Korean firms must keep initiating new 
innovations which would futher strengthen their existing technologies, while avoiding a situation 
where the rival companies take initiatives embracing new innovations potentially disruptive to the 
current technological systems led by Korean firms. Based on their studies on Canon and Samsung, 
Lee and Malerba (2016b) suggested the same strategy (called endogenizing the future innovations) to 
protect leading firms from falling into the incumbent trap. The entire industrial world is going 
through another round of changes in the techno-economic paradigm along with the rise of 3D 
printing and the Internet of things, which usher in the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” that can 
significantly affect product, process, and business model innovations (Bechtold et al. 2014). When 
combined with institutional rigidities and firm legacies, these new innovations may place the current 
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